Evolutionary Game Dynamics in a Fitness-Dependent Wrlght-Fisher Process with Noise

• 作者: 全吉 王先甲
• 来源期刊: 理论物理通讯：英文版
• 学科: 工学
• 关键词: 噪声强度 进化博弈 动力学 健身 马尔可夫过程 进化稳定策略 ESS 极限分布
• 年，卷（期）: 2011,（9）
• 页码范围: 404-410
• 页数: 7页
• 分类号: O225|TB53
• 语种: 英文

摘要

Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright- Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to describe the level of player＇s rationality and noise intensity in environment are introduced. In contrast with the fixation probability method that used in a noiseless case, the introducing of the noise intensity parameter makes the process an ergodic Markov process and based on the limit distribution of the process, we can analysis the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games. We illustrate the effects of the two parameters on the ESS of games using the Prisoner＇s dilemma games （PDG） and the snowdrift games （SG）. We also compare the ESS of our model with that of the replicator dynamics in infinite size populations. The results are determined by simulation experiments.

作者信息

序号	姓名	单位	发文数	被引次数	H指数	G指数
1	王先甲		279	3088	26.0	41.0
2	全吉		2	3	1.0	1.0