Career concerns, shareholder monitoring and investment efficiency: From the perspective of compensation contract rigidity in Chinese SOEs

• 作者: Hualin Wan Kai Zhu Xinyuan Chen
• 来源期刊: 中国会计学刊：英文版
• 学科: 经济
• 关键词: CAREER CONCERNS SHAREHOLDER MONITORING Investment
• 年，卷（期）: 2015,（1）
• 页码范围: 59-73
• 页数: 15页
• 分类号: F276.1

摘要

This paper presents theoretical analysis of how career concerns and shareholder monitoring affect chief executive officer(CEO) agency costs. We investigate investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement based on a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs) during the 1999–2007 period and find that there is a significant decline in investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement, relative to other periods, and that this decline becomes less significant under stronger shareholder supervision. Our research furthers understanding of the significance of SOE incentive and monitoring mechanisms.