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摘要:
Accounting information plays a key role in economic development. Macroscopically speaking, accounting information isthe basis of macro-decision-making. Microscopically speaking, accounting information is the effective embodiment of enterprise'smanagement ability and status, and is also the basis for many investors to make reasonable investment decisions. Therefore, it can beseen that the distortion of accounting information will cause negative effects in many aspects. Ringing. Based on this, this paper selectsA-share non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges fi'om 2011 to 2016, analyzes the impact ofaccounting information distortion on corporate debt financing costs, and introduces internal control into the study of the relationshipbetween the tw0. Through empirical analysis, we find that: the effectiveness of internal control and debt financing costs significantlynegative correlation; accounting fraud and accounting manipulation are two indicators of accounting information distortion and corporatedebt financing costs significantly positive correlation; internal control can significantly inhibit the correlation between accountinginformation distortion and debt financing costs.
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篇名 Research on the Correlation between Accounting Information Distortion and Corporate Debt Financing
来源期刊 财会通讯:下 学科 经济
关键词 ACCOUNTING information DISTORTION ACCOUNTING FRAUD ACCOUNTING MANIPULATION DEBT FINANCING Internal control Moderating effect
年,卷(期) 2018,(11) 所属期刊栏目
研究方向 页码范围 F0003-F0003
页数 1页 分类号 F2
字数 语种
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研究主题发展历程
节点文献
ACCOUNTING
information
DISTORTION
ACCOUNTING
FRAUD
ACCOUNTING
MANIPULATION
DEBT
FINANCING
Internal
control
Moderating
effect
研究起点
研究来源
研究分支
研究去脉
引文网络交叉学科
相关学者/机构
期刊影响力
财会通讯:下
月刊
1002-8072
42-1103/F
武汉市武昌紫阳东路45号
38-192
出版文献量(篇)
5247
总下载数(次)
25
总被引数(次)
0
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