Leakage Is Prohibited: Memory Protection Extensions Protected Address Space Randomization

• 来源期刊: 清华大学学报自然科学版（英文版）
• 年，卷（期）: 2019,（5）
• 页码范围: 546-556
• 页数: 11页
• 语种: 英文
• DOI: 10.26599/TST.2018.9010128

摘要

Code reuse attacks pose a severe threat to modern applications.These attacks reuse existing code segments of vulnerable applications as attack payloads and hijack the control flow of a victim application.With high code entropy and a relatively low performance overhead,Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) has become the most widely explored defense against code reuse attacks.However,a single memory disclosure vulnerability is able to compromise this defense.In this paper,we present Memory Protection Extensions (MPX)-assisted Address Space Layout Randomization (M-ASLR),a novel code-space randomization scheme.M-ASLR uses several characteristics of Intel MPX to restrict code pointers in memory.We have developed a fully functioning prototype of M-ALSR,and our evaluation results show that M-ASLR:(1) offers no interference with normal operation;(2) protects against buffer overflow attacks,code reuse attacks,and other sophisticated modern attacks;and (3) adds a very low performance overhead (3.3％) to C/C++ applications.