Food safety inspection and the adoption of traceability in aquatic wholesale markets: A game-theoretic model and empirical evidence

• 作者: JIN Cang-yu Retsef LEVI LIANG Qiao Nicholas RENEGAR ZHOU Jie-hong
• 来源期刊: 农业科学学报（英文版）
• 年，卷（期）: 2021,（10）
• 所属期刊栏目: Agricultural Economics and Management
• 页码范围: 2807-2819
• 页数: 13页
• 语种: 英文
• DOI: 10.1016/S2095-3119(21)63624-9

摘要

Supply chain traceability is key to reduce food safety risks, since it allows problems to be traced to their sources. Moreover, it allows regulatory agencies to understand where risk is introduced into the supply chain, and offers a major disincentive for upstream agricultural businesses engaging in economically motivated adulteration. This paper focuses on the aquatic supply chain in China, and seeks to understand the adoption of traceability both through an analytical model, and empirical analysis based on data collected through an extensive (largest ever) field survey of Chinese aquatic wholesale markets. The field survey includes 76 managers and 753 vendors, covering all aquatic wholesale markets in Zhejiang and Hunan provinces. The analytical and empirical results suggest that the adoption of traceability among wholesale market vendors is significantly associated with inspection intensity, their individual history of food safety problems, and their risk awareness. The effect of inspection intensity on traceability adoption is stronger in markets which are privately owned than in markets with state/collective ownership. The analysis offers insights into the current state of traceability in China. More importantly, it suggests several hypothesized factors that might affect the adoption of traceability and could be leveraged by regulatory organizations to improve it.