Non-CEO top managers’ monitoring power and CEO pay-performance sensitivity in state-owned enterprises:Evidence from Chinese state-owned listed firms

• 作者: Liuyang Ren Qianhua Lei Rui Lu
• 来源期刊: 中国会计学刊:英文版
• 学科: 经济
• 关键词: Inside directors STATE-OWNED enterprises Non-CEO top MANAGERS Pay-performance sensitivity
• 年，卷（期）: 2019,（4）
• 页码范围: 411-430
• 页数: 20页
• 分类号: F272.92

摘要

Few studies have focused on the role of non-CEO top manager inside directors in corporate governance,especially in the context of emerging countries.Despite their tendency to be subject to CEOs,non-CEO top manager inside directors can counterbalance CEOs in specific situations.Using panel data on state-owned listed companies in China,we conduct an empirical study of how non-CEO top manager inside directors influence CEO pay-performance sensitivity under serious agency conflicts.We find that the proportion of non-CEO top manager inside directors is significantly negatively correlated with CEO pay-performance sensitivity in state-owned enterprises,whereas the shareholding proportion of the controlling shareholders weakens this relationship.Furthermore,we find that non-CEO top manager inside directors significantly increase executives’on-the-job consumption.Our conclusions are robust to endogeneity testing and alternative specifications.