Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on highly clustered community networks

• 来源期刊: 中国物理B（英文版）
• 关键词: prisoner's dilemma cooperation clustering coefficient community structure
• 年，卷（期）: 2009,（7）
• 页码范围: 2623-2628
• 页数: 6页
• 语种: 英文

摘要

This paper studies the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a highly clustered community network in which the clustering coefficient and the community size can be tuned. It finds that the clustering coefficient in such a degreehomogeneous network inhibits the emergence of cooperation for the entire range of the payoff parameter. Moreover,it finds that the community size can also have a marked influence on the evolution of cooperation, with a larger community size leading to not only a lower cooperation level but also a smaller threshold of the payoff parameter above which cooperators become extinct.