From proof-of-concept to exploitable

• 来源期刊: 网络空间安全科学与技术（英文版）
• 关键词: Exploit Vulnerability Taint analysis Fuzzing Symbolic execution
• 年，卷（期）: 2019,（1）
• 页码范围: 70-94
• 页数: 25页
• 语种: 中文

摘要

Exploitability assessment of vulnerabilities is important for both defenders and attackers.The ultimate way to assess the exploitability is crafting a working exploit.However,it usually takes tremendous hours and significant manual efforts.To address this issue,automated techniques can be adopted.Existing solutions usually explore in depth the crashing paths,i.e.,paths taken by proof-of-concept (PoC)inputs triggering vulnerabilities,and assess exploitability by finding exploitable states along the paths.However,exploitable states do not always exist in crashing paths.Moreover,existing solutions heavily rely on symbolic execution and are not scalable in path exploration and exploit generation.In this paper,we propose a novel solution to generate exploit for userspace programs or facilitate the process of crafting a kernel UAF exploit.Technically,we utilize oriented fuzzing to explore diverging paths from vulnerability point.For userspace programs,we adopt a control-flow stitching solution to stitch crashing paths and diverging paths together to generate exploit.For kernel UAF,we leverage a lightweight symbolic execution to identify,analyze and evaluate the system calls valuable and useful for exploiting vulnerabilities.We have developed a prototype system and evaluated it on a set of 19 CTF (capture the flag) programs and 15 realworld Linux kernel UAF vulnerabilities.Experiment results showed it could generate exploit for most of the userspace test set,and it could also facilitate security mitigation bypassing and exploitability evaluation for kernel test set.