Why Belief Statements Are Not Truth-Functional

• 作者: Keith Burgess-Jackson
• 来源期刊: 哲学研究:英文版
• 学科: 文学
• 关键词: logic propositional logic truth-functionality truth-functions belief belief statements
• 年，卷（期）: 2020,（11）
• 页码范围: 683-688
• 页数: 6页
• 分类号: H31

摘要

Truth-functionality is the most important concept in propositional logic.Some compound propositions are truth-functional and some are not.In this essay,I explain the difference between truth-functional compound propositions and non-truth-functional compound propositions,using what I call“belief statements”as an example of the latter.My explanation of why belief statements are not truth-functional is both more thorough and(I submit)more illuminating than the explanations provided by the leading logic textbooks.The authors of these textbooks may wish to incorporate some of my suggestions into future editions.Alternatively,they may direct their students to this essay for edification.