The impact of honesty and trickery on a Bayesian quantum prisoners' dilemma game

• 作者: Bo-Yang Liu Hong-Yi Dai Ming Zhang Wei Gao Xiao-Feng Guo Xin Zhao Ying Liao
• 来源期刊: 中国物理B（英文版）
• 关键词: quantum game Bayesian game quantum contract
• 年，卷（期）: 2020,（7）
• 页码范围: 250-257
• 页数: 8页
• 语种: 英文
• DOI: 10.1088/1674-1056/ab8c3c

摘要

To explore the influence of quantum information on the common social problem of honesty and trickery,we propose a Bayesian model for the quantum prisoners' dilemma game.In this model,the players' strategy formation is regarded as a negotiation of their move contract based on their types of decision policies,honesty or trickery.Although the implementation of quantum information cannot eliminate tricky players,players in our model can always end up with higher payoffs than in the classical game.For a good proportion of a credibility parameter value,a rational player will take an honest action,which is in remarkable contrast to the observation that players tend to defect in the classical prisoners' dilemma game.This research suggests that honesty will be promoted to enhance cooperation with the assistance of quantum information resources.