Side-channel attack-resistant AES S-box with hidden subfield inversion and glitch-free masking

• 作者: Xiangyu Li Pengyuan Jiao Chaoqun Yang
• 来源期刊: 半导体学报（英文版）
• 年，卷（期）: 2021,（3）
• 所属期刊栏目: ARTICLES
• 页码范围: 65-70
• 页数: 6页
• 语种: 英文
• DOI: 10.1088/1674-4926/42/3/032402

摘要

A side-channel attack (SCA)-resistant AES S-box implementation is proposed,which is an improvement from the power-aware hiding (PAH) S-box but with higher security and a smaller area.We use the composite field approach and apply the PAH method to the inversion in the nonlinear kernel and a masking method to the other parts.In addition,a delaymatched enable control technique is used to suppress glitches in the masked parts.The evaluation results show that its area is contracted to 63.3％ of the full PAH S-box,and its power-delay product is much lower than that of the masking implementation.The leakage assessment using simulation power traces concludes that it has no detectable leakage under t-test and that it at least can thwart the moment-correlation analysis using 665 000 noiseless traces.